Citations in Illinois
Statistics, citations and compliance trends for long-term care facilities in Illinois.
Statistics for Illinois (Last 12 Months)
Financial Impact (Last 12 Months)
Compliance trends in Illinois
Data through Jan 2026Comparisons below measure the most recent period Feb 2025 – Jan 2026 against the prior period Feb 2024 – Jan 2025 (two equal 12-month windows). The most recent 3 months are excluded because CMS is still publishing them.
Top tags by month · last 24 months
dashed = still reportingMonthly citation counts for the 5 most-cited tags. The dashed tail is the 3-month reporting lag.
Frequency movers
Biggest change in how often each tag is cited, as a rate per 100 inspections (so it isn't skewed by survey volume): Feb 2025 – Jan 2026 vs the prior period Feb 2024 – Jan 2025. Only tags with at least 20 citations in both periods are shown.
Severity movers
Tags whose average scope/severity shifted the most: Feb 2025 – Jan 2026 vs the prior period Feb 2024 – Jan 2025. The number is the average severity on the A–L scale (A=0…L=11); the letter is the band it falls in. A rise means the same tag is being cited at a more serious level — note the average can move enough to rank here while staying within the same letter. Same 20-citation minimum applies.
Care domain movers
Citations grouped into CFR care domains — F-tags by their §483 regulatory section (CMS State Operations Manual, Appendix PP) — measured as a rate per 100 inspections: Feb 2025 – Jan 2026 vs the prior period Feb 2024 – Jan 2025. Share is the domain's portion of citations this period; avg severity is the mean scope/severity letter and immediate jeopardy the percentage cited at J–L, both over the current period. Domains with at least 20 citations in both periods are shown; the sparkline tracks the last 12 months (left = oldest).
Immediate jeopardies · this period
Citations at the most serious scope/severity — J–L, immediate jeopardy, residents placed at risk of serious harm or death — over Feb 2025 – Jan 2026 vs the prior period Feb 2024 – Jan 2025. "Surveys with an IJ" counts distinct health inspections that had at least one.
Survey activity · by month
faded/dashed = still reportingCitations each month split into complaint-driven (unscheduled, triggered by grievances) vs standard surveys — bars, left axis — with the number of inspections as a line on the right axis. Rising inspections signal more scrutiny; a rising complaint share means more off-cycle surveys. The most recent 3 months are still being reported.
Deficiency-free survey rate
Share of health surveys that found zero deficiencies — the odds of a clean survey. Feb 2025 – Jan 2026 vs the prior period Feb 2024 – Jan 2025; the most recent 3 months are still being reported (dashed).
Penalties · by month
faded = still reportingTotal civil money penalty dollars imposed on the state's facilities each month — how hard the state is enforcing. The most recent 3 months are still being reported, and penalties often lag citations by several months.
Emerging tags
Tags that weren't established last period but surged — an early warning, distinct from movers (which track already-common tags). Criteria: fewer than 20 citations in the prior period, but at least 10 this period and 2.5× their prior volume. The sparkline shows monthly counts over the last 12 months (left = oldest).
Latest Citations in Illinois
A resident with severe mental illness, cognitive impairment, and a well-documented history of elopement and exit-seeking was placed on 1:1 monitoring but was allowed by a CNA to be behind a closed bedroom door and out of direct visual supervision, contrary to facility expectations for 1:1 status. During this lapse, the resident exited through a window, climbed a fence, and was later found outside with a displaced foot fracture. In a separate incident, a cognitively intact resident with a history of substance abuse, whose family visits were supposed to be supervised, had an unsupervised visit with grandparents known to bring contraband, was later found unresponsive with signs of overdose, received naloxone, and tested positive for oxycodone despite having no order for it, while his roommate had an active oxycodone prescription and staff found a white powdery substance and related items in the room, indicating a failure to prevent resident access to an unprescribed opioid.
A resident with multiple chronic conditions and severe cognitive impairment was found unresponsive and not breathing, with no documented code status, POLST, or DNR in the medical record. Nursing staff verified the absence of respirations and pulse but did not initiate CPR or call 911. An LPN reported she proposed starting CPR due to the unknown code status, but an RN declined. Leadership and clinical staff stated in interviews that facility practice and expectations are that, when a code status is unknown or no POLST is on file, the resident is to be treated as full code and CPR should be initiated.
A resident with multiple comorbidities was admitted with an unstageable sacral pressure ulcer and placed on Medi-Honey dressings three times weekly. Over several weeks, the wound enlarged and remained covered with slough, but a wound specialist NP was not consulted until the ulcer had significantly worsened. When the NP did evaluate the wound, she performed debridements and ordered daily Dakin’s solution and later Dakin’s with Silvadene and calcium alginate, but the facility’s TAR showed staff largely continued Medi-Honey three times weekly, applied Dakin’s on only a few days, and never administered Silvadene. The wound progressed to a stage 4 ulcer with odor and signs of infection, later cultured positive for MRSA and diagnosed in the hospital as an infected stage 4 decubitus ulcer with osteomyelitis requiring surgical debridement, contrary to the facility’s own policy requiring timely reassessment and implementation of MD/NP-directed wound care.
A resident with extensive traumatic fractures, internal injuries, and a long history of chronic pain management was admitted on existing orders for ibuprofen PRN and Percocet for pain, with hospital discharge instructions indicating scheduled Percocet three times daily. During the first night after admission, staff administered only ibuprofen, documented as ineffective, and did not provide any Percocet because the hospital had not sent written narcotic prescriptions and the DON did not obtain a timely verbal order to access Percocet from the emergency kit. The resident repeatedly complained of severe, escalating pain, used the call light frequently, yelled out, and ultimately called 911, signed out AMA, and was transported to the ED, where she reported uncontrolled pain and opioid withdrawal symptoms and received Percocet.
The facility did not maintain ceiling structures and plumbing in a safe and clean condition, resulting in long‑standing stained and bulging ceiling tiles above the nurses’ station and an actively leaking pipe in the ice machine/vending area. Surveyors observed missing ceiling tiles exposing insulation, wiring, and water pipes, standing water collected in a trash can, and soaked blankets and towels on the floor. An RN and an LPN reported that the ceiling tiles above the nurses’ station had been stained for months or longer, and that the ceiling had been leaking in the ice machine area for several days, where the ice machine is used for all residents. The Regional Maintenance Director confirmed the stained tiles and the leaking pipe and acknowledged that the tiles had not yet been replaced.
The facility did not ensure that all CNAs received the required 12 hours of annual competency in‑service training, including dementia care and abuse prevention. Review of records for two agency CNAs showed no documented annual CNA training, despite a facility assessment stating that nurse aide in‑services must total at least 12 hours per year and address competency needs. One agency CNA reported not receiving any annual competency training or knowing it was required, and another reported receiving no training in the past year while providing care to all residents. The AIT and DON confirmed that these CNAs had not received the required annual training from either the facility or their agency.
The facility did not ensure that all CNAs, including agency CNAs, received required behavioral health training as outlined in its facility assessment, which called for dementia management, resident abuse prevention, and care of cognitively impaired residents with behaviors. Review of training records for two agency CNAs showed no behavioral health training over the prior year, and both CNAs reported they had not received such training from either the facility or their agency, despite one CNA confirming they provide care to all residents. The AIT and DON acknowledged that these CNAs had not received the required behavioral health training.
Surveyors identified multiple unsanitary conditions and ineffective sanitization practices in the kitchen, including a non-functioning, leaking garbage disposal with rotting food, leaking pipes near the ice machine, and a dirty HVAC unit shedding debris onto surfaces. The kitchen door to the dining room was damaged and improperly hinged, and staff reported it had recently been cut and sanded as part of a replacement. The wall-mounted chemical dispenser lacked compatible sanitizer bottles, and when staff prepared sanitizer solution, test strips showed no chlorine present; staff instead used dish soap and multipurpose cleaner from housekeeping to clean food contact surfaces. These failures affected the sanitation of food preparation and service areas for all residents in the facility.
A resident with dementia and behavioral disturbances consistently kept her TV volume excessively loud, to the point it could be heard from the nurse’s station and the end of the hallway, disturbing nearby residents who reported difficulty sleeping and ongoing disruption. Multiple residents stated that the loud TV had been a problem for some time, especially at night, and one reported needing headphones to block the noise. Staff, including an LPN and a CNA, confirmed frequent complaints, noted that the resident became verbally aggressive when asked to lower the volume, and reported that she insisted on keeping her door open and held the remote to prevent staff from adjusting the sound, despite a care plan indicating an agreed-upon lower volume level.
A resident with a known history of aggressive behavior deliberately kicked another resident while residents were lined up for a smoke break, causing the victim to fall onto his hip and later report ongoing left hip pain requiring an X-ray. Multiple witnesses, including another resident and CNAs, described the act as intentional physical abuse. Although an LPN, the DON, and the ADON all recognized the event as reportable abuse under facility policy, facility staff did not call the police or an ambulance for the victim despite his repeated requests, and the Administrator confirmed the incident was not reported to the state surveying agency.
Failure to Supervise High-Risk Resident on 1:1 and Prevent Access to Unprescribed Opioid
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to prevent accidents and ensure adequate supervision for residents at high risk for elopement and substance misuse. One resident with schizophrenia, psychosis, major depressive disorder, severe cognitive impairment, and a documented history of wandering, elopement, and exit-seeking behaviors was identified as an elopement risk and placed on an elopement care plan and 1:1 supervision. Nursing and psychiatry notes documented repeated attempts by this resident to use keypads, push and kick exit doors, set off alarms, hover at exits, attempt to climb through windows, and a prior incident of exiting the building and being returned by social services. Despite this, while on 1:1 monitoring, the assigned CNA allowed the resident’s bedroom door to be fully closed and the resident to be out of direct line of sight, contrary to the facility’s expectations that residents on 1:1 remain in continuous visual contact with the aide and that doors not be shut. On the morning of the elopement event, the night-shift CNA reported that the resident had been up visiting, eating, and sleeping, and that at 5:45 AM the resident was in her room on the floor. Shortly thereafter, the resident stated she wanted to use the bathroom; the CNA reported seeing her enter the bathroom with the bedroom door left open so the bathroom door could be observed. When the day-shift CNA arrived to assume the 1:1, she found the bedroom door completely shut, opened it, and was told by the night-shift CNA that the resident was in the bathroom. After briefly leaving to put away her belongings and returning, the day-shift CNA found the resident no longer in the room and the window open. The nurse initiated a headcount and search, and the resident was found outside near a tree, holding herself up due to foot pain. Investigation and hospital records showed the resident had exited through her window, climbed over a fence approximately six feet high, and sustained a displaced fracture of the left metatarsal bone after landing on the ground while attempting to escape. A second deficiency concerns the facility’s failure to ensure a resident with a history of substance abuse was protected from access to an opioid medication not prescribed to him. This resident, cognitively intact with diagnoses including schizophrenia, anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder, and major depression, had a care plan noting behavior problems and a history of returning from family outings intoxicated or under the influence of unknown substances, with instructions that family visits be supervised in common areas. On the day of the incident, the resident, who lived on a locked behavior unit, had an unsupervised visit outside with grandparents known by staff to have previously brought contraband into the building. Later that day, staff observed the resident stumbling in the hallway wearing sunglasses and then becoming unresponsive in his room, with slow, abnormal breathing and no response to sternal rubs. Nurses recognized signs consistent with drug overdose, administered naloxone, and the resident was transferred to the emergency room, where a urine drug screen was positive for oxycodone, despite no oxycodone order for this resident. Further review showed that the resident’s roommate at the time had an active PRN order for oxycodone 5 mg for pain related to a right tibia fracture, and both residents had histories of substance abuse. Staff reported finding a white powdery substance and empty bags with white residue in the overdosed resident’s dresser drawer, and another resident on the unit was found snorting a crushed substance with paraphernalia on his dresser. The DON acknowledged that the overdosed resident had an oxycodone overdose diagnosis from the emergency room and that it was plausible he had taken the roommate’s medication, although the exact source of the oxycodone could not be confirmed. Facility policies required that medications, including controlled substances such as oxycodone, be administered only to the resident for whom they were prescribed and be securely stored in locked compartments inaccessible to residents and visitors, but the events showed that the resident was able to obtain and self-administer oxycodone that was not prescribed to him.
Failure to Initiate CPR for Resident With Unknown Code Status
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to initiate cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and call emergency medical services for an unresponsive resident whose code status was unknown. The resident had been admitted with diagnoses including chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, cirrhosis of the liver, hypertension, and dysphagia, and was documented as severely cognitively impaired and dependent on staff for several activities of daily living. The resident’s medical record did not contain any documentation of a code status, POLST, DNR order, or other advance directive limiting resuscitative efforts. In the early morning hours, a nurse entered the resident’s room to assist the roommate and observed that the resident was not breathing but was still warm to the touch. The nurse then obtained a second nurse to verify the absence of breathing. The facility’s final investigation report states that the nurse assessed the resident and noted absence of respirations, absence of a palpable pulse, and physical findings consistent with post-mortem changes, and determined the resident had expired. Despite the lack of any documented DNR or advance directive in the record available for review at that time, CPR was not initiated and 911 was not called. Interviews with staff confirmed that the resident’s code status was unknown at the time of the event and that no resuscitative efforts were made. The ADON stated that if a resident’s code status or POLST form cannot be found, the resident is considered a full code, and that when in doubt a resident is a full code. The DON reported that the LPN who found the resident did not know the code status and did not initiate CPR or call 911, even though the resident was a recent admission and no POLST form was on file. The LPN stated she suggested initiating CPR because there was no POLST, but the RN present told her not to start CPR. Other staff interviewed stated that if a resident’s code status is not known or cannot be found, CPR is supposed to be initiated.
Failure to Obtain Timely Wound Consultation and Implement Ordered Pressure Ulcer Treatments
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure timely wound specialist involvement and adherence to ordered wound treatments for a resident admitted with an existing unstageable sacral-coccygeal pressure ulcer. The resident, a 75-year-old with multiple comorbidities including type 2 diabetes mellitus, prior necrotizing fasciitis, hemiplegia, DVT, and hypothyroidism, was admitted with an unstageable sacral pressure ulcer measuring 1.5 cm x 1.5 cm, fully covered with slough but documented as clean, without odor or signs of infection. The admission physician orders indicated the resident may be seen by a wound care physician, and the initial treatment ordered on admission was cleansing the coccyx area, applying skin prep, Medi-Honey, fluff gauze, and a dry dressing three times weekly and as needed. Despite this, the wound care nurse did not obtain a wound specialist consultation until approximately five weeks after admission, during which time the wound measurements increased and remained unstageable with slough covering the wound bed. Over the ensuing weeks, the wound care nurse documented weekly assessments showing progressive enlargement of the wound, which by early November measured 4.3 cm x 3.8 cm with excoriation around the wound and a bed fully covered with slough. The treatment administration record for November showed the resident continued to receive the same Medi-Honey treatment three times a week. The wound specialist NP first evaluated the resident on a date in early November, documenting an unstageable/unclassified pressure ulcer measuring 5.0 cm x 6.0 cm x 0.2 cm with 100% slough, moderate serosanguinous drainage without odor, and no signs of infection in the peri-wound area. The NP recommended cleansing, Medi-Honey, calcium alginate, and foam dressing three times weekly and as needed, and performed a bedside debridement to remove slough and necrotic tissue. A second debridement was performed one week later, after which the NP ordered Dakin’s 1/4 strength solution with wet-to-moist gauze and foam dressing daily and as needed. The NP later documented that Dakin’s was ordered as a debriding agent and antiseptic to help prevent infection and that daily treatment was important. Despite the NP’s subsequent orders and recommendations, the facility did not consistently implement the updated wound care regimen. The NP’s note on a mid-November visit documented the wound as now a stage 4 pressure injury measuring 6.5 cm x 4.5 cm x 2.0 cm, with moderate serosanguinous drainage and odor, 100% slough, and peri-wound signs and symptoms of infection. The NP ordered a wound culture and topical antibiotics, including Dakin’s solution and Silvadene cream with calcium alginate and foam or dry dressing daily and as needed. However, the treatment administration record showed the resident continued to receive Medi-Honey three times weekly, with Dakin’s solution applied only on three specific days and no documentation that Silvadene was ever provided. The wound nurse acknowledged that she typically received verbal orders from the NP and did not read the NP’s written notes for one to two days, and that the only change she recalled was increasing Medi-Honey frequency and later changing to Santyl. The primary physician stated he relied on consultants’ recommendations, but the record showed the resident was not seen by the wound specialist until the wound had significantly deteriorated. Ultimately, the wound culture was positive for MRSA, and hospital records documented an infected stage 4 sacral decubitus ulcer with osteomyelitis requiring operative excisional debridement of skin, subcutaneous fat, muscle, and fascia. The facility’s own wound prevention and healing policy required nurses to provide wound care per physician orders, notify the physician of lack of progress, and have the wound MD/NP evaluate and change treatment when the patient was not responding, which was not followed in this case.
Failure to Provide Ordered Opioid Analgesia for Resident With Severe Traumatic Injuries
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to provide ordered opioid pain medication to a newly admitted resident with extensive traumatic injuries and a history of chronic pain management. The resident was admitted following a serious motor vehicle accident that resulted in multiple fractures (thoracic vertebrae, ribs, pelvis, sacrum, humerus, ilium), lung contusions, traumatic pneumothorax, liver and spleen lacerations, and hemoperitoneum. Hospital documentation showed that prior to admission the resident had been on Percocet 5-325 mg three times daily as an outpatient and was discharged from the hospital with instructions to continue Percocet 5-325 mg one tablet three times daily (scheduled) and ibuprofen 800 mg every 8 hours as needed for pain. The facility’s physician orders on admission included ibuprofen 800 mg every 8 hours as needed and Percocet 5-325 mg every 8 hours as needed for pain. On the evening and night following admission, the facility administered only ibuprofen and did not provide any Percocet, despite the resident’s repeated complaints of severe pain. The MAR documented that ibuprofen 800 mg was given late in the evening for a pain level of 4 and was noted as ineffective in controlling the pain, with no documentation that Percocet was ever administered. The DON documented that the hospital had not sent written prescriptions (“hard scripts”) for the narcotic pain medication, that the pharmacy reported not receiving such scripts, and that the facility was unable to access narcotics from the emergency kit without a prescription. The DON contacted the pharmacy and the hospital but did not obtain an order that would allow access to Percocet from the emergency kit, and she did not contact a provider at the time she first realized the resident had arrived without the necessary narcotic prescriptions. The DON later stated she was not aware that a verbal order could have been used to access the emergency kit and acknowledged there was a discrepancy between the facility’s PRN Percocet order and the hospital’s scheduled Percocet order, of which she had not been aware. Throughout the night, the resident continued to report uncontrolled pain, which she later described as escalating to 10/10, and she reported yelling out in pain and repeatedly requesting Percocet. CNAs reported that the resident was constantly on the call light, complaining about needing pain pills, threatening to sign out AMA, and yelling out. The DON documented that the resident complained of pain and inability to sleep, had received PRN ibuprofen, and that vital signs were within normal limits; she also noted that the resident had two loose stools but did not associate them with opioid withdrawal. The pharmacy director confirmed that the correct dose of Percocet was available in the emergency kit and that it could have been accessed with a provider’s emergency verbal order. The medical director stated that, had he been contacted sooner, he could have given a verbal order to access Percocet from the emergency kit or ordered transfer to the ER. Instead, after the resident called 911 requesting transport for pain management, the medical director eventually ordered transfer to the ER at the resident’s request, and the resident signed AMA paperwork stating she would not return. In the ER, the resident presented with complaints of pain all over, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and reported opioid withdrawal symptoms, with documentation that no pain medication had been administered between the time of admission to the facility and arrival at the ER, approximately 12 hours later. The ER administered Percocet and discharged her with a prescription for Percocet. The facility’s own pain management policy stated that it was the policy of the facility to respect and support the resident’s right to optimal pain assessment and management, and referenced an opioid use policy and procedure. Despite this, the record shows that the facility did not provide the ordered opioid medication, did not resolve the lack of a written prescription in a timely manner through available mechanisms (such as obtaining a verbal order to access the emergency kit), and did not adjust its actions when ibuprofen was documented as ineffective. The combination of the resident’s extensive injuries, documented chronic pain management history, hospital discharge instructions for scheduled Percocet, and the facility’s failure to administer any Percocet or secure timely prescriber authorization led to the resident experiencing uncontrolled pain, reporting opioid withdrawal symptoms, and ultimately signing out AMA and calling 911 for transport to the ER for pain management.
Failure to Maintain Safe and Well-Repaired Ceilings and Plumbing
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to maintain the physical environment in a safe, clean, and well‑repaired condition, specifically related to ceiling tiles and a cold water pipe. The Facility Maintenance Director job description required planning, organizing, and directing maintenance operations to ensure the building was safe and comfortable, including repairing facility property, coordinating outside vendors when needed, maintaining supplies and equipment, promptly reporting damage to the Administrator, and making weekly inspections. A former Maintenance Director was terminated for incompetence and unsatisfactory job performance, including failure to complete assigned tasks such as fixing or replacing stained ceiling tiles by an established deadline. At the time of the survey, the facility census was 72 residents, all potentially affected by the environmental deficiencies. On observation, surveyors noted an actively leaking water pipe in the ceiling of the ice machine/vending area, with a trash can placed beneath it containing about one inch of standing water, two soaked blankets and multiple wet towels on the floor, and a missing 2x2 ceiling tile exposing insulation, wiring, and water pipes. Twelve ceiling tiles above the nurses’ desk were brown‑stained and visibly bulging, suggesting ongoing water damage, and on a subsequent day the ice machine/vending area still had two missing 2x2 ceiling tiles with exposed insulation, wiring, and pipes. An RN reported that the ceiling tiles above the nurses’ station had been stained since she began working there months earlier, and an LPN stated the tiles had been stained for as long as she could remember and that the ceiling had been leaking in the ice machine area for several days, noting that the ice machine there was used for all residents. The Regional Maintenance Director confirmed the stained tiles above the nurses’ station and the leaking pipe in the ice machine/vending area, stating that the tiles had not yet been changed because they took time to cut and no one had done it.
Failure to Provide Required Annual Competency Training for CNAs
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to ensure all CNAs received the required 12 hours of annual competency in‑service training, including dementia care and abuse prevention, as required by its Facility Assessment Tool and federal regulations. The Facility Daily Census Report documented 72 residents residing in the facility at the time of the survey. The Facility Assessment Tool specified that required in‑service training for nurse aides must be at least 12 hours per year, sufficient to ensure continuing competence, address areas of weakness identified in performance reviews and the facility assessment, and may address special resident needs. Review of employee and training records for two agency CNAs (V9 and V10) for the period 4/30/25 through 4/30/26 showed no documentation of the required 12 hours of annual CNA competency training. During interviews, one agency CNA (V9) stated that they had not received 12 hours of annual competency training from either the facility or the hiring agency and were unaware of the requirement for 12 hours of annual training. Another agency CNA (V10) stated they had not received any training within the last year and confirmed they provide care to all residents in the facility. The Administrator‑In‑Training (V1) and the DON (V2) both confirmed that V9 and V10 had not received the required 12 hours of annual CNA training from either the facility or the agency that employed them.
Lack of Behavioral Health Training for Agency CNAs
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to ensure that all Certified Nurse Aides (CNAs), including agency CNAs, received behavioral health training as required by the facility’s own Facility Assessment Tool. The Facility Assessment Tool dated 3/26/26 specifies that required in‑service training for nurse aides must include dementia management, resident abuse prevention, and, for nurse aides providing services to individuals with cognitive impairments, training on the care of cognitively impaired residents with behaviors. Review of the Facility Daily Census Report dated 4/29/26 shows that 72 residents were residing in the facility at the time of the survey. Review of the employee and training records for two agency CNAs (V9 and V10) for the period 4/30/25 through 4/30/26 showed no documentation of behavioral health training. In interviews, one agency CNA (V9) stated that they had not received behavioral health training from either the facility or the hiring agency, and another agency CNA (V10) stated they had not received any training within the last year and confirmed they provide care to all residents in the facility. The Administrator‑In‑Training (V1) and the DON (V2) confirmed that these agency CNAs had not received behavioral health training from the facility or their agency.
Unsanitary Kitchen Conditions and Ineffective Surface Sanitization
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to maintain effective sanitizer levels for cleaning food contact surfaces and to keep kitchen equipment in a safe and sanitary condition, potentially affecting all 64 residents documented on the census. During a kitchen walkthrough, surveyors observed a non-functioning garbage disposal containing chunks of food and clotted milk with water leaking from the seals, pooling on the floor, and draining into a floor drain, accompanied by a strong odor of rotting food. The sprayer above the disposal had hard water buildup that caused water to spray outward onto the wall, floor, and surrounding area. Pipes to the ice machine were leaking water down the wall and pooling on the floor. The HVAC unit in the kitchen had a large amount of brownish dirt and debris, including brown fuzzy lint-like material, with some pieces falling onto the surface below. The kitchen door to the large dining room had a broken top hinge, loose bolts, and a jagged, splintered knob-side edge. Staff interviews and observations further showed improper sanitation practices and lack of appropriate chemical supplies. The cook reported the garbage disposal had been leaking and non-functional for about a week and that maintenance staff were aware but unable to fix it. The cook also stated that maintenance staff had been sawing and sanding a replacement door in the kitchen while food was being cooked and served, although the maintenance director later stated the cutting and sanding were done outside. The wall-mounted chemical dispenser above the kitchen sink had no sanitizer bottles attached. When the dishwasher and assistant dietary manager prepared sanitizer solution using the dispenser, test strips showed no chlorine color change, and the dishwasher was unsure what color the strip should turn. The assistant dietary manager stated the facility did not have compatible chemical bottles for the dispenser and that staff were instead using dish soap in sanitizer buckets and multipurpose cleaner from housekeeping. The administrator stated the facility did not have an environmental policy for maintaining equipment.
Failure to Control Excessive TV Noise Affecting Nearby Residents
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to maintain environmental noise at a comfortable level for multiple residents due to one resident’s excessively loud television. Surveyors observed that one resident’s TV volume was so loud it could be heard from the nurse’s station and from the end of the hallway, even with other residents’ doors closed. A sign on this resident’s door stated “Do Not Shut Door,” and staff reported that the resident liked the TV volume loud and was non-compliant with requests to lower it. Nursing notes documented that when asked to reduce the TV volume, the resident became verbally aggressive toward staff. The resident’s diagnoses included unspecified dementia with behavioral disturbance, adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, hemiplegia and hemiparesis following cerebral infarction, and restlessness and agitation. Other residents on the same hall reported ongoing disruption from the loud TV, particularly at night when they were trying to sleep. One resident across the hall stated that the loud TV had been an issue for a while and affected other residents on the hall. Another resident one room away reported that the neighbor’s TV was really loud all day and especially at night, that staff were asked to intervene, and that the resident with the loud TV would briefly turn it down and then increase the volume again; this resident reported needing to use headphones to cancel out the noise. Staff, including an LPN and a CNA, confirmed that residents complained they could not sleep due to the loud TV, that the resident with the TV became upset and verbally aggressive when asked to turn it down, and that the TV volume could be heard from the end of the hallway. The care plan for the resident with the loud TV identified a problem of turning the volume up excessively, with an agreed target volume level of 40 and instructions for staff to remind the resident of this agreed volume.
Failure to Protect Resident From Physical Abuse and to Report Incident
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to protect a resident from physical abuse by another resident when one resident with a known history of antagonistic, verbally and physically aggressive behavior kicked another resident, causing a fall and subsequent pain. Multiple witnesses, including another resident and two CNAs, reported that while residents were lined up for a smoke break, the aggressor resident grabbed the victim resident’s leg in an attempt to make him fall and, when that failed, deliberately kicked the victim’s left leg or knee, causing him to fall onto his left hip. The victim resident consistently reported that the kick knocked him off his feet, that he landed on his left hip, and that he continued to experience left hip and buttock pain rated 5/10 with walking and lying on his back. A behavior note documented that the aggressor resident stood up from his wheelchair and kicked the victim resident in the leg for no reason, witnessed by residents and staff, and a subsequent nurse’s note documented the victim’s complaint of left hip pain and an order for a left hip and pelvis X-ray. Despite staff recognizing the event as physical abuse and a reportable incident under the facility’s Abuse and Retaliation Prevention and Reporting policy, the facility did not take required reporting and response actions. An LPN stated that the incident was reportable and notified the Administrator, and both the DON and ADON acknowledged that one resident kicking another constitutes physical abuse that should be reported to the state surveying agency and to the police. However, the Administrator confirmed that the facility did not report the incident to the state surveying agency and that facility staff did not call the police or an ambulance for the victim resident, even though the victim repeatedly requested that the police and an ambulance be called. Instead, the aggressor resident independently called 911 for himself. The facility’s own policy defines physical abuse as willful infliction of injury, including kicking, and affirms residents’ right to be free from abuse, but these standards were not followed in this incident.
Trusted data from CMS and state health departments
Every citation, penalty and Plan of Correction is sourced from public CMS records (latest release June 24, 2026) and official state health department websites — never guesswork.
Some of the Latest Corrective Actions taken by Facilities in Illinois
- Established a unit-based binder/list to identify residents with sexually inappropriate behaviors (and their plans of care) and updated/reviewed it at least weekly to support staff identification and supervision (J - F0600 - IL) (J - F0600 - IL)
- Implemented ongoing monitoring/rounding processes for residents at risk (e.g., every 2 hours with documentation trackers/logs; end-of-shift nursing rounds to verify residents remained free of abuse) (J - F0600 - IL) (J - F0600 - IL) (J - F0610 - IL)
- Implemented an Abuse Checklist and team-based investigation process to standardize required reporting/investigation steps and improve investigation completeness (J - F0610 - IL)
- Added abuse-process tools and expectations to onboarding and pre-shift processes (e.g., reviewed abuse policies/procedures with agency staff prior to shifts; added the Abuse Checklist to new staff onboarding; discussed abuse policy/prevention at new-hire orientation) (K - F0600 - IL) (J - F0610 - IL) (K - F0610 - IL) (J - F0600 - IL)
- Implemented ongoing QAPI/QA oversight of abuse prevention and investigations (e.g., reviewed all abuse findings by QAPI; held monthly QAPI meetings to discuss investigations and compliance; reviewed abuse-audit results with the interdisciplinary team/QA committee and implemented corrective actions as indicated) (K - F0600 - IL) (J - F0610 - IL) (K - F0610 - IL) (J - F0600 - IL)
- Implemented ongoing reassessment processes for abuse risk and consent capacity (e.g., completed Abuse UDA on new admissions within 72 hours and quarterly/annually/as needed; monitored consenting intimate relationships weekly to ensure continued consent) (J - F0600 - IL)
- Implemented technology and competency checks to strengthen oversight (e.g., ordered a camera system for public areas/hallways; conducted random competency checks by Abuse Coordinators) (J - F0610 - IL)
Failure to Maintain Safe Baseboard Heaters and Bed Placement Resulting in Severe Resident Burns
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to maintain baseboard heaters in a safe manner and to implement an effective system to monitor heater surface temperatures and resident room arrangements, including bed placement, to prevent burn hazards and potential fire risks. During a tour, all resident rooms were noted to have six-foot baseboard heaters beneath the windows, with measured surface temperatures as high as 172°F. In one room, a stuffed animal pillow was resting directly on top of the heater and a bag was positioned immediately adjacent to it; in another room, a window curtain was draped over the heater. In multiple rooms, thermostats were missing from the heaters, and one resident’s bed was positioned directly against the heater, with the resident’s hand and arm within reach of the hot surface. The resident, who was hard of hearing, stated that the heater gets very hot. The surveyor found the heater surface too hot to safely touch. The facility’s Maintenance Director confirmed that the facility did not maintain the manufacturer’s operating and preventive maintenance instructions for the baseboard heaters, including the parts list with component descriptions and the air-balance report, and that a complete set of these documents was not available on-site. He also stated that he had not previously monitored or documented the surface temperatures of baseboard heaters or heater covers and was not aware of any established process for doing so. Following a burn incident involving a resident, he reported conducting only a visual inspection of all heaters to identify units needing repair or replacement and measuring the surface temperature of only four heaters, confirming that no formal process for routine temperature monitoring had been implemented. The Administrator-in-Training verified that curtains, personal items, and residents should be kept approximately 12 inches from the heaters to prevent burns and fire hazards and acknowledged that the facility did not have the manufacturer’s operating and preventive maintenance instructions. One resident involved in the incident was an older adult with diagnoses including hemiplegia, convulsions, respiratory failure, type II diabetes mellitus with diabetic hemiplegia, chronic kidney disease stage III, depression, and dementia with anxiety. This resident was cognitively severely impaired and dependent or required extensive assistance for all ADLs, received hospice care, and had no signs or symptoms of pain prior to the burn incident. A CNA reported that around midnight she was unable to turn the resident because the resident’s arm was stuck between the bed and the baseboard heater; when she moved the bed, she observed a large burn up and down the resident’s left arm and immediately notified the nurse. Progress notes and emergency room documentation describe partial-thickness, second-degree burns with blistering extending from the pinky finger up the arm to near the shoulder, requiring emergency treatment and ongoing painful wound care. The coroner stated that the resident was non-verbal and could not have yelled for help when being burned and characterized the situation as neglectful of the facility to have allowed the burns to reach that severity. Another resident whose room was observed during the survey was moderately cognitively impaired, with a care plan that did not include measures to keep the resident at a safe distance from the baseboard heater or to protect from burns. This resident’s bed was positioned directly against a heater with a missing thermostat, and the resident’s right hand and arm were within reach of the heater surface. Across multiple rooms, the combination of high heater surface temperatures, missing thermostats, lack of manufacturer guidance, absence of a monitoring system for heater temperatures, and unsafe placement of beds and combustible items near heaters constituted the actions and inactions that led to the identified deficiency. These failures resulted in a resident becoming entrapped between the bed and a baseboard heater and sustaining painful burns that required emergency room treatment, and had the potential to affect all 87 residents residing in the facility.
Removal Plan
- Positioned all residents and their beds at a safe distance from baseboard heaters.
- Obtained and documented surface temperatures of all baseboard heaters in all resident rooms and verified all were below 140°F.
- Obtained manufacturer guidelines for baseboard heaters to ensure safe operation and compliance with recommended safety standards.
- Educated the Maintenance Director to ensure baseboard heaters do not exceed 140°F and to routinely monitor and document temperatures for ongoing compliance.
- Educated all department heads to ensure resident beds are never lowered or pushed against baseboard heaters when in use; implemented and posted a visual guide showing the appropriate safe distance between beds and heaters.
- Educated all licensed nurses to ensure resident beds are never lowered or pushed against baseboard heaters when in use.
- Educated all CNAs and unlicensed staff to ensure resident beds are never lowered or pushed against baseboard heaters when in use.
- Implemented a process to ensure room assignments are appropriate for the number of residents in each room to allow safe placement away from environmental hazards, including baseboard heaters.
- Conducted a facility-wide audit to identify additional risks related to heater placement and bed positioning; immediately corrected concerns and updated resident care plans accordingly.
- Implemented environmental temperature rounds to ensure baseboard heater temperatures are 140°F or below.
Failure to Initiate CPR for a Full-Code Resident
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to initiate CPR in accordance with a resident’s documented full code status, physician orders, POLST, and care plan. The resident had multiple diagnoses including hypokalemia, type 2 diabetes mellitus, emphysema, cerebellar stroke syndrome, and congestive heart failure, and was documented as cognitively intact. The physician’s orders and POLST form specified attempt resuscitation/CPR and full treatment, and the care plan stated that CPR would be initiated in the event of cardiac arrest and continued until EMS arrival or a physician order to stop. The resident’s daughter, who was POA, reported that the resident remained alert and oriented until death and had reiterated within the last year that she wished to remain a full code. On the day of the incident, a CNA found the resident unresponsive, without breathing or a pulse, at approximately 8:20 AM and notified the assigned LPN. The CNA reported that the LPN told her the resident was a DNR. The LPN went to the room, verified the resident was not breathing, and did not initiate CPR. Another LPN was called to verify death; as she went to the room, she asked if CPR was needed and believed the first LPN went to check the medical record for code status. The second LPN confirmed there were no heart sounds or respirations and did not initiate CPR. The progress note later documented that the CNA had notified the nurse around 8:20 AM that the resident was no longer breathing or had a pulse, and that another nurse verified there was no pulse/heartbeat and no breathing activity. Subsequently, the second LPN overheard the first LPN on the phone with the physician stating that the resident was a full code. After this, the second LPN reviewed the physician’s orders and confirmed the resident was indeed a full code and reported the issue to the DON. The first LPN told surveyors he did not follow protocol, assumed the resident was a no code based on her appearance, did not review her paperwork to verify code status, and stated he had only received two days of orientation. The DON and Administrator both stated they would have expected nurses to follow facility protocols and administer CPR, and the resident’s physician stated he would have expected the nurse to honor the resident’s wishes and initiate CPR. The facility’s CPR policy required that if an individual is found unresponsive and sudden cardiac arrest is likely, staff should begin CPR and verify code status, initiating basic life support unless a valid DNR order is verified.
Removal Plan
- Re-educate all licensed and direct care staff on CPR requirements, including initiation unless a valid DNR order is present
- In-service all staff on resident code status and where to check code status
- Check off all agency staff on knowledge of CPR and knowledge of code status before working
- Verify all residents' code status to ensure accuracy and accessibility
- Remove any staff involved from resident care pending re-education and competency validation
- Complete hands-on CPR return demonstrations for all staff
- Check emergency equipment (crash cart, oxygen) and confirm it is functional
- Review policy to ensure it clearly requires initiation of CPR unless a valid DNR order is verified
- Add code status verification to shift report and electronic medical record review
- Assign HR responsibility for CPR compliance and education
- Schedule routine mock code drills
- Incorporate CPR requirements into orientation for all new hires
Failure to Protect Cognitively Impaired Residents From Repeated Resident-to-Resident Sexual Abuse
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to protect cognitively impaired residents from sexual abuse by another resident with a known pattern of sexually inappropriate behaviors. One resident (R4), who had moderately impaired cognition, a history of hypersexual behavior, and was able to self-propel in a wheelchair, repeatedly engaged in sexual contact with other residents who were severely cognitively impaired and dependent on staff for ADLs. On 11/22/25, R4 took a glove from a nurse’s cart while in a hallway on B wing and placed her gloved hand on another resident’s (R7) vaginal area, fondling her labia. Staff separated the residents, but R4’s care plan was not updated to address this sexual behavior, and no interventions were added to prevent further sexual abuse. R7’s care plan, which identified her as low risk for abuse despite dementia with depression and anxiety, was also not updated with interventions to protect her from sexual abuse. On 2/10/26, while in the dementia unit, R4 again engaged in sexual abuse, this time toward a male resident (R5) who had severe cognitive impairment and required assistance with ADLs. During the evening medication pass, staff observed R4 wheeling herself quickly toward R5, then placing her whole hand inside his pants and undergarments, touching his penile area. Staff immediately separated the residents, and R4 became upset and yelled that she wanted to return to R5. The incident was reported to the ADON, and R4 was reportedly placed on 1:1 supervision. However, R4’s care plan was not revised to address this sexual behavior, and R5’s care plan, which later documented him as moderate risk for abuse due to poor cognition, did not include interventions related to the sexual abuse incident or measures to protect him from further sexual abuse. On 3/11/26, R4 again sexually abused another male resident (R6), who had severe cognitive impairment, Alzheimer’s dementia, bipolar disorder, and was identified in his care plan as high risk for abuse due to dementia and mental health diagnoses. During an activity in the common area, R4 and R6 were seated side by side in wheelchairs when staff observed R4’s hand in R6’s groin area, moving toward his private area in an up-and-down tapping motion. R4 loudly expressed sexual intent, stating she wanted to have sex with R6 and would do whatever she wanted. Staff immediately separated them, and R6 appeared wide-eyed and looking around as if for help. Despite this incident and R4’s known pattern of hypersexual behavior, R4’s care plan still did not include interventions addressing her sexual behaviors, and R6’s care plan, although identifying him as high risk for abuse, had no interventions to address the sexual abuse or to protect him from further sexual abuse. Across these incidents, staff interviews confirmed that R4 had been hypersexual, touching other residents in their private areas and making sexually explicit statements to other residents. The DON acknowledged awareness that R4 had inappropriately touched residents in the dementia unit. The Dementia Director/Social Services stated that when abuse occurs, a trauma assessment should be done immediately to assess emotional and psychological impact and provide supportive interventions, but no trauma assessments were completed for R7, R5, or R6 at the time of their respective incidents. The physician reported he was not made aware of the sexual abuse incidents involving R4 and the other residents until 3/13/26. The Regional Director of Operations stated that the care plans for R4, R7, R5, and R6 should have been updated when the incidents occurred to ensure proper interventions were in place. The facility’s own Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation policy defined sexual abuse as non-consensual sexual contact of any type with a resident and required protection of residents’ health, welfare, and rights, but the facility failed to implement timely care plan updates and protective interventions following repeated episodes of resident-to-resident sexual abuse. These failures resulted in an Immediate Jeopardy situation beginning on 11/22/25 when R4 first sexually abused R7 and continuing through subsequent incidents involving R5 and R6. The surveyors determined that the facility did not protect residents from sexual abuse, did not promptly assess for trauma, did not notify the physician in a timely manner, and did not revise care plans or implement effective interventions despite clear evidence of ongoing sexually aggressive behavior by R4 toward severely cognitively impaired residents.
Removal Plan
- R4 was separated from other residents and placed under continuous 1:1 supervision to prevent further inappropriate contact until discharge from facility or her condition warrants immobility.
- R5, R6 and R7 were assessed by nursing staff for physical injury and psychosocial distress.
- SSD/Memory Care Director verified all memory care residents have had a risk for abuse assessment completed per policy.
- The physicians and parties responsible for all residents involved were notified.
- R4, R5, R6 and R7 had an Abuse/Neglect/Trauma assessment.
- R5, R6, and R7 had the Trauma Informed Care Assessment completed.
- Abuse policies were reviewed and no revisions were required.
- DON and ADON educated all staff on facility Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation policy with an emphasis on identifying abuse, reporting abuse, appropriate interventions, following resident care plans, and monitoring of residents with a history of aggressive or sexual behaviors.
- Any staff who did not receive education will be educated prior to next shift.
- The DON or designee reviewed facility abuse policies and procedures with any agency staff prior to their shift.
- Regional Nurse Director in-serviced Administrator and DON on identifying abuse (including sexual abuse) and reporting abuse.
- Regional Nurse Director in-serviced Administrator and DON on the process to relay information to staff regarding the resident's care plans or changes to a resident's care plans pertaining to interventions/strategies to redirect resident when exhibiting either aggressive or sexual behaviors.
- Emergency QAPI was held with Medical Director to discuss citation and develop interventions to ensure safety of other residents.
- Root Cause Analysis was completed.
- R5, R6, and R7 had their care plan updated with safety interventions to protect from abuse.
- R4's care plan was updated to reflect interventions put in place to safeguard other residents on the unit, including but not limited to: one-to-one supervision and providing residents with sensory items to help keep residents occupied and hands busy.
- Administrator will audit weekly for 6 weeks and then monthly for 3 months to monitor residents with history of sexual behaviors/resident abuse and verify appropriate interventions are in place and care plans updated accordingly.
- All abuse findings will be reviewed by the QAPI team to ensure appropriate measures have been put in place.
Failure to Thoroughly Investigate Sexual Abuse Allegation and Restrict Alleged Perpetrator
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to thoroughly investigate and substantiate an allegation of sexual abuse made by a cognitively intact resident, and the failure to restrict the alleged perpetrator’s access to residents during and after the investigation. One resident (R1), who was admitted with multiple medical diagnoses including COPD, Type 2 diabetes, major depressive disorder, heart disease, and overactive bladder, required extensive physical assistance with ADLs and used a wheelchair. R1 had no cognitive impairment, no documented behaviors, and no history of making false allegations. At the end of February, R1 reported to the Social Services Director (V3) and then to the Administrator (V1) that a CNA (V4) had touched her breast during care a couple of days earlier. V3 acknowledged that when R1 began to describe an incident involving her chest, he stopped her from continuing, did not obtain full details, and focused only on notifying the Administrator. V1 documented a telephone interview with R1 in which R1 stated that during a brief change, V4 touched her breast while repositioning her, that she told him to stop, and that he stopped. V1 also interviewed V4, who denied any inappropriate touching. On 3/7/26, during the survey, R1 provided a more detailed account of the incident, stating that about a week earlier, around 9–10 PM, V4 got into bed with her, lay sideways on top of the comforter, rubbed the side of her breast through the blanket, giggled, and made repeated sexual comments such as that she could be his girlfriend and that she wanted it. R1 reported that she told him to get out and leave her room. She stated that she had anticipated not being believed and therefore called her friend and fellow resident R2 on the phone when V4 came into the room so R2 could hear the interaction. R1 reported that she had told V3 exactly what she later told the surveyor, but that V3 had told her not to talk about it and that the facility would handle it. R1 also stated that after the incident she was moved to another room and staff ensured V4 was not assigned to her, but that he continued to work in the facility. R2, who also had no cognitive impairment or behaviors documented in her assessment and no history of making false allegations, corroborated R1’s account by describing what she heard over the phone. R2 stated she heard a male CNA, identified as V4, making sexual remarks, calling R1 “honey,” laughing, and repeatedly pressuring her while R1 told him to quit, said no, and told him to get out. R2 reported that no one from the facility had interviewed her about what she heard. R1’s sister (V7) and husband (V6) both reported that R1 had disclosed that a CNA had gotten into bed with her and touched her breast, and V7 stated that R1 was of sound mind, became unusually quiet and withdrawn after the incident, and was fearful at night about who was working on the floor. A local sheriff’s deputy (V8) confirmed that R1 reported that V4 jumped into bed with her, said she could be his girlfriend, and touched the sides of her breasts, and that R2 reported hearing V4 over the phone making inappropriate sexual remarks and trying to kiss R1 while R1 said no. Despite these reports, the facility’s written investigation, completed on 3/2/26, concluded that the allegation was unsubstantiated. The investigation documentation stated that R1’s interview was inconsistent, that V4 denied the allegation, that R1’s roommate denied any incidents with V4, and that other residents and staff reported feeling safe and denied inappropriate behavior. The documentation also stated that V4 was “not on the schedule” and therefore not suspended, and that he was not scheduled until March 2, 2026, when his next shift began at 7:00 PM. However, the facility’s daily schedule showed that V4 had worked on 2/26/26, a couple of days before the allegation, and that after the investigation was marked complete and unsubstantiated on 3/2/26, V4 returned to work his scheduled shifts on 3/2/26, 3/3/26, 3/5/26, and 3/6/26 with access to all residents. During a later interview, the DON (V2) characterized the situation as “he said she said,” referenced both R1 and R2 as having behaviors and psychiatric consults, and suggested the allegation was suspicious in light of media reports about abuse at another facility, despite both residents being described elsewhere as alert, oriented, and reliable historians. The surveyors determined that the facility failed to thoroughly investigate the abuse allegation, failed to interview the identified witness R2 in a timely manner, and failed to substantiate the allegation, resulting in the alleged perpetrator continuing to have access to all residents. The Immediate Jeopardy was determined to have begun when R1’s initial report of sexual abuse was made to V3 and V1 on 2/28/26, and continued while V4 remained on the schedule and worked multiple shifts after the facility had documented the investigation as completed and unsubstantiated. The facility’s abuse policy required immediate protection of residents involved in reports of possible abuse and prompt, aggressive investigation of all allegations, including sexual abuse defined as sexual harassment, sexual coercion, or sexual assault. In this case, the facility did not obtain or document a complete initial account from R1, did not promptly interview the identified witness R2, and relied heavily on V4’s denial and generalized resident interviews to conclude the allegation was unsubstantiated. As a result, the alleged perpetrator was allowed to continue working with access to all 93 residents in the facility until the Immediate Jeopardy was addressed on 3/10/26.
Removal Plan
- Perform full body check on resident; document findings
- Perform full body checks on residents in the facility that are not interviewable
- Notify family and physician
- Update resident care plan pertaining to the alleged abuse
- Immediately suspend CNA pending an investigation
- Review facility resources for stress management and policy related to the occurrence; revise as indicated
- Educate staff on how to take an initial report of abuse and what should be included in the report
- Educate Social Service Director on how to take an initial report of abuse and what should be included in the report
- Educate Administrator on how to conduct a thorough investigation and how to determine if abuse occurred
- Assess residents for any markings that could be related to physical contact and interview residents who are able to be interviewed; document findings
- Conduct interviews with residents and document concerns
- Reeducate all staff and managers on facility abuse policy, abuse prevention, and stress management
- Provide pop quizzes to staff about abuse
- Audit compliance using Quality Assurance Audit tool for abuse
- Review results of abuse audits with the facility's interdisciplinary team
- Discuss abuse policy and prevention with all new hires at new hire orientation
- Audit all residents' abuse assessments and abuse care plans for accuracy; review audits by QA committee with evaluation of trends/patterns and implement corrective action as indicated; adjust audit frequency based on goal attainment; monitored by Administrator
- Hold emergency QA meeting with the Interdisciplinary Care Team and Medical Director to discuss abuse allegation and plans of correction; monitored by Administrator
Failure to Ensure Continuous and Effective Pain Management for Hospice Residents
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to provide effective pain management for three residents receiving pain control, including one hospice resident at end of life. One resident with multiple myeloma, pulmonary embolism, chronic pain, spinal stenosis, osteoporosis with pathological fractures, fibromyalgia, and other comorbidities was on hospice care with orders for a Fentanyl patch, scheduled oral Dilaudid every two hours, and PRN Hydrocodone for breakthrough pain. Her care plan called for evaluation of pain, monitoring for non-verbal indicators, and assessing the effectiveness of pain interventions every shift. Despite this, the facility allowed her oral Dilaudid supply to be depleted and did not ensure timely replacement, resulting in a period of approximately six hours without the ordered narcotic while she was actively dying. Family members reported that on the day in question the resident was in severe, uncontrolled pain, thrashing and crawling in bed, attempting to get out of bed, and requiring family to hold her to prevent falls. Multiple family members stated that the facility could not get her Dilaudid all day, that they repeatedly called hospice and even a hospital seeking help, and that the resident suffered intensely until medication finally arrived later in the afternoon. The hospice RN had identified the day before that the Dilaudid supply would not last, sent refill orders to the facility’s pharmacy before noon, and instructed facility staff to notify hospice if the medication was not delivered so alternate arrangements could be made. The hospice RN reported she never received such a call and only learned the medication was depleted after the last partial dose was given around 10:00 a.m. Facility nurses confirmed that the last dose from the bottle was given that morning, that no additional Dilaudid was available in the building, and that they relied on hospice to locate an open pharmacy and bring replacement medication, which did not arrive until mid- to late afternoon. During the period without Dilaudid, staff documented that the resident’s scheduled doses at noon and 2:00 p.m. were not given and coded as “other/see progress notes,” while the resident exhibited restlessness, grimacing, and agitation as described by CNAs and family. An agency LPN caring for the resident stated she considered sending the resident to the emergency room for pain relief but did not do so, and another nurse reported that the facility’s pharmacy did not make Sunday deliveries. The primary physician/medical director stated he was not notified that the resident was out of Dilaudid or that her pain had increased. The facility’s own pain management policy required recognition of behavioral signs of pain and review of the MAR to determine the effectiveness and frequency of pain medication use, but the resident’s MDS documented no receipt of scheduled or PRN pain medications or non-medication interventions despite concurrent documentation that she was receiving an opioid. Two additional hospice residents with pain needs also did not receive adequate pain assessment and management. One resident with multiple sclerosis, contractures, and other serious conditions was on a scheduled Norco regimen three times daily and had PRN Dilaudid ordered for moderate to severe pain and dyspnea. He reported that he was always in pain, that staff did not routinely ask him about pain, and that he had to request medication himself, sometimes forgetting until his pain became severe. His MAR showed all scheduled Norco doses documented with a pain level of 0 over multiple days and no use of PRN Dilaudid during the review period, while a hospice CNA stated she always asked him about pain and that he consistently reported being in pain. Another hospice resident with Parkinson’s disease, severe dementia, heart failure, and other diagnoses had orders for scheduled Oxycodone four times daily and PRN Hydromorphone every four hours. His care plan required monitoring and recording pain characteristics every shift and observing for non-verbal signs of pain such as changes in breathing, facial expressions, and vocalizations. However, his MAR documented pain scores of 0 on all shifts over several weeks and no administration of PRN Hydromorphone. A hospice CNA reported that this resident complained of pain at times and that she had to notify the nurses. During observation, the resident was seen flinching in his legs, grimacing, gritting his teeth, and trying to adjust his feet, yet he was unable to answer questions, indicating reliance on staff to recognize and respond to non-verbal pain behaviors that were not reflected in the recorded pain assessments.
Removal Plan
- The DON, ADON, and floor nurses began assessing residents for pain using a standardized scale; residents with pain received immediate intervention; physicians were notified and new orders obtained as needed.
- The DON began re-educating licensed staff; education included medication inventory and physician notification.
- Licensed staff were educated to notify the physician if any medication is not available.
- Licensed staff were educated to notify the DON immediately if medication is not available or if there will be a delay in receiving ordered/reordered medications immediately upon discovery of a medication shortage.
- All notifications and order changes are to be documented in real time.
- The DON and ADON will complete medication audits to ensure residents always have an adequate amount of pain medications available.
- If less than four days of medications are noted, an order/reorder will be submitted to the physician; this audit will include hospice residents.
- Licensed staff unable to attend the education were educated via phone with the DON and ADON as a witness.
- A message was sent to all licensed staff via Mediprocity with the education.
- The DON/designee initiated real-time audits.
- The DON and ADON completed a 100% house-wide audit comparing pharmacy-dispensed medication orders for pain management to on-hand inventory; reorders were processed and delivered; orders were clarified/updated as needed; care plans were revised as needed.
- The DON/designee will complete biweekly audits for 4 weeks.
- The Administrator and DON will submit the plan to QA for monthly review.
- The QAPI committee will review and offer recommendations as needed until compliance is met.
Failure to Safely Manage Community Pass for Dependent Quadriplegic Resident
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure the safety and adequate supervision of a dependent resident during a community pass. The resident was a quadriplegic, paralyzed from the neck down, dependent on staff for all care, and required a mechanical lift for transfers. Her assessments documented extensive care needs, lack of cognitive impairment, and that she was not capable of unsupervised outside pass privileges. A Community Survival Skills assessment indicated she was not sufficiently able to navigate safely in the community, and several items related to self-harmful behavior, adherence to pass policies, and following rules could not be determined. The discharge planning review identified that her physical and mental health problems increased her vulnerability and that she would likely suffer from lack of proper care and could become a victim or perpetrator of abuse/neglect in a less structured setting. Despite these documented limitations, the resident left the facility on a community pass with a male individual described by staff as her boyfriend or ex-boyfriend, who had reportedly just been released from jail or prison. Staff accounts show that earlier in the day the resident repeatedly stated she was going to leave and that her boyfriend was coming to get her. In the evening, after dinner, the man arrived, and staff assisted the resident with putting on her coat and preparing to leave. Staff questioned whether the man understood that the resident was paralyzed from the neck down and required complete care, and he reportedly stated he was aware of her care needs. Staff observed him take her out of the building and wheel her across the street to a city bus stop, and they expressed concern among themselves about who would be caring for her once she left. No medications were sent with her, and there was no physician order in place authorizing community access. The facility’s documentation and communication around the resident’s departure were incomplete and inconsistent. The sign-out sheet at the facility entrance contained an undated sign-out for the resident with an illegible signature for the party accepting responsibility, and the resident’s record contained no notes on the day she left indicating that she was going out on pass, with whom she left, or when she was expected to return. Nursing staff reported varying understandings of curfew expectations, with references to an 8 p.m. return time and an alleged agreement with the Administrator for a midnight return, but there was no clear documentation of these arrangements. When the resident did not return, staff discussed among themselves that she had called saying she would be back by midnight and that if she did not return she should be admitted to a hospital, but there was no indication in the record that law enforcement or family were promptly notified. The Administrator and charge nurse later stated that staff should have contacted the non-emergency police line and family when the resident failed to return, but this was not documented as having occurred. The resident ultimately did not return to the facility and was later admitted to an acute care hospital with a diagnosis including fluid overload.
Removal Plan
- Re-educate all staff on ensuring the safety of a dependent resident during community pass.
- Re-educate all staff on notifying law enforcement when a resident fails to return to the facility at the designated time.
- Re-educate all staff on completing an audit of residents with pass privileges for appropriateness related to resident care needs while out on pass.
- Re-educate all staff on ensuring resident contact information is available prior to going out on pass.
- Re-educate all staff on ensuring residents are aware of expectations for return to the facility.
- Educate new hires on the community pass systems prior to starting on the floor.
- Provide on-the-spot education as needed regarding community pass processes.
- Re-educate staff not present in the facility via phone prior to the beginning of their next shift and obtain signed education sheets.
- Social Services/DON to complete an audit of residents with pass privileges for appropriateness related to resident care needs while out on pass, including an audit of contact information.
- Implement a QAPI audit tool to audit weekly the community survival skills assessment for appropriateness and safety related to care needs while out on pass.
- Implement a weekly audit of residents who sign out on pass to ensure they returned at the designated time or that police were called.
- Implement a weekly audit to ensure resident contact information is available prior to going out on pass.
- Ensure residents are aware of expectations for return to the facility via a resident handout and resident council meeting.
- Implement a weekly audit to verify residents received and understand expectations for return to the facility.
- Analyze audit results and present analysis through QAPI quarterly.
- Conduct a root cause analysis to identify barriers and further education needed.
- Complete an Ad Hoc QAPI to review systems and analyze the root cause analysis.
- Have the QAPI Committee determine whether audits will continue after the initial audit period.
Failure to Prevent Elopement and Implement Fall Prevention Interventions
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure an environment free from accident hazards and to provide adequate supervision and assistive devices to prevent accidents, including elopement and falls. One cognitively impaired resident with known exit-seeking behavior was allowed to elope from the facility without staff awareness, and multiple residents at risk for falls did not have care-planned fall prevention interventions consistently implemented. The elopement resident had a BIMS score of 6 indicating severe cognitive impairment, diagnoses including dementia, and a documented history of exit-seeking and wandering behaviors. The resident had an electronic alert band ordered and applied due to exit-seeking behavior, and the care plan identified the resident as at risk for elopement with an intervention to utilize an electronic alert band. Despite this, the resident was last seen in bed around 2:15–2:30 a.m. and subsequently left the building through the front door without staff knowledge. Police found the resident walking alone on a nearby street and returned the resident to the facility around 3:36 a.m., at which time staff documented that the facility had been unaware the resident had left. Staff interviews and observations revealed that the electronic alert system did not function effectively as an audible warning at the nurse’s station. A CNA reported not hearing any alarm when the resident exited, explaining that the sound of the alarm was located between a set of double doors and could not be heard when those doors were closed. The CNA confirmed that the last time she saw the resident, the resident was in bed with eyes closed and appeared to be sleeping. A former LPN stated she only became aware of the elopement when police arrived at the front desk and informed her that the resident had been found outside the facility. The administrator confirmed that the root cause of the elopement was that the electronic alert alarms could not be heard at the nurse’s station and acknowledged that when the system was initially tested, staff only checked the alarm audibility while standing between the double doors, and no one had checked whether the alarm could be heard outside those doors. The social services director confirmed that the resident’s elopement risk care plan had been initiated months earlier due to comments about wanting to leave and wandering behavior, and acknowledged that the interventions in place were not effective since the resident was able to elope. The facility also failed to implement fall prevention interventions as care-planned for several residents at risk for falls and dependent on staff for transfers. One resident with diagnoses including CHF, Type 2 DM, and dependence on enabling machines and devices had an MDS indicating dependence for sit-to-stand and toilet transfers, and a care plan requiring two staff and use of a total body (Hoyer) lift for transfers. Despite this, a CNA was observed transferring this resident from a wheelchair to a toilet using a stand lift alone, and she acknowledged that two staff should perform the transfer but stated she proceeded alone due to short staffing. The restorative nurse and PTA confirmed that if a resident is care-planned for two-person mechanical lift transfers, that plan must be followed for safety. Additional residents at risk for falls were observed with their beds at waist height despite care-planned interventions requiring beds to be maintained in the lowest appropriate position. One resident with hemiplegia and hemiparesis, dependent on staff for transfers and identified as at risk for falls, had a care plan specifying mechanical lift for transfers and ensuring the bed is in the lowest position. During observation, this resident was found lying in a bed at waist height. When questioned, the LPN confirmed the resident was a mechanical lift transfer and acknowledged that the bed was elevated to waist height and should be in the lowest position for safety. Another resident with paraplegia, dependent on staff for chair/bed transfers and at risk for falls, also had a care plan intervention to ensure the bed is in the lowest position. This resident was likewise observed in a bed at waist height, and the LPN confirmed the bed height. The DON stated that beds are to be in low position but noted that some residents prefer higher beds and do not allow staff to lower them, indicating that care-planned fall prevention interventions were not consistently maintained as required by facility policy and resident care plans.
Removal Plan
- Reassessed R75 for elopement risk after the elopement occurred and determined resident remained an elopement risk.
- Located R75 and returned resident to the facility.
- Completed a head-to-toe assessment for R75 with no signs of injury noted.
- Updated R75’s care plan to address the elopement event.
- Notified R75’s family member and Primary Care Physician/Medical Director of the elopement.
- Reviewed facility policies related to the occurrence (Elopement, Routine Resident Checks, Incidents/Accidents, Alarms, electronic alert band, Wanderers, Changes in Condition).
- Updated the Wanderguard policy to include considering alternative interventions in the event of equipment failure (e.g., room change to a more secure floor).
- Updated assessments and care plans for residents at risk for elopement.
- Placed R75 on 1:1 supervision pending move to a more secured unit.
- Moved the only other resident requiring electronic monitoring to a higher/more secured unit.
- Reassessed all residents for elopement risk.
- Implemented a process that all new admissions will have an elopement risk assessment completed per MDS schedule (within 7 days of admission, annually, and as needed).
- Reviewed and updated care plans for residents identified at risk for elopement on admission.
- Placed pictures of at-risk residents in binders at all nursing stations and the receptionist desk.
- Evaluated at-risk residents with active exit-seeking behaviors for possible room change to a more secured unit to limit access to the front entrance door.
- Evaluated at-risk residents to determine whether an electronic monitoring bracelet is appropriate.
- Conducted staff interviews to identify further potential risk.
- Conducted Code drills on all shifts to assess staff knowledge and preparedness.
- Reeducated all staff and managers on routine resident checks, exit seeking, incidents/accidents, elopement policy/procedure, and location of elopement-risk binders.
- Administered staff competency quizzes on elopement.
- Reeducated staff and managers on elopement risk and reporting behaviors/changes related to elopement risk to the appropriate discipline.
- Reeducated reception staff on monitoring front doors, resident safety, and proper Code Green procedure.
- Educated all staff on the electronic monitoring system.
- Implemented monitoring of exit doors by staff when unalarmed.
- Assigned receptionist to monitor the front entrance door.
- Required the receptionist to arm the door and required first-floor nurses to monitor the door when the receptionist is not present.
- Implemented alarm panel checks with a signed monitoring sheet by first-floor staff to ensure door alarms are activated when doors are not monitored by staff.
- Implemented weekly checks of exterior door alarms by the Maintenance Director and EVS Supervisor to ensure alarms are working and doors are secured.
- Met with R75’s daughter to discuss and implement new interventions.
- Initiated a work order to add an annunciator panel to the first-floor nurses station to amplify the alarm.
- Added elopement training to annual abuse training to ensure staff knowledge of elopement plans.
- Started QAA compliance audits using an elopement and door-check audit tool with review at monthly QAPI meetings.
- Assigned IDT members to complete audits and submit them to the Administrator for oversight of completion.
- Started review of audit results regarding elopement and door alarm working condition with the IDT with review at monthly QAPI.
- Implemented an Administrator daily audit to confirm the exterior front door alarm is activated each day by the receptionist prior to leaving.
- Added to new-hire orientation education on elopement and administration of competency quizzes.
- Established that the facility Quality Assurance Team/IDT will meet at least monthly to review elopement-risk residents, trends/patterns, and implement action steps.
- Held an emergency QA meeting with the IDT and Medical Director to discuss the elopement and approve the Removal Plan.
- Assigned ongoing monitoring of the Removal Plan to the Administrator, DON, ADON, and Social Services.
Failure to Protect Cognitively Impaired Resident From Sexual Abuse by High-Risk Peer
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to protect a cognitively impaired resident from sexual abuse by another resident with a known history of sexually inappropriate behavior and battery. The abused resident was admitted with diagnoses including bipolar disorder, autistic disorder, and drug-induced subacute dyskinesia, and had a BIMS score of 9, indicating moderately impaired cognition. Her care plan identified a difficult past related to severe mental illness and risk factors for being a recipient or perpetrator of mistreatment, with an expectation that she would remain safe and free of mistreatment. The alleged perpetrator had diagnoses including schizoaffective disorder bipolar type and generalized anxiety disorder, and a BIMS score of 15, indicating intact cognition. His care plan documented sexually oriented behavior, including making crude, sexually oriented, profane, or suggestive remarks, and directed staff to implement limit setting and intervene if he attempted inappropriate touching. On the day of the incident, the newly admitted resident reported that the male resident approached her, asked if she was new, and obtained her room number. Later that night, video surveillance showed him entering her bedroom and remaining there for approximately 30 minutes before she went to the nurse’s station and he exited the room. The resident stated that while she was lying in bed, he entered her room, initially stood and talked, then sat on her bed, rubbed her leg, and asked for sexual favors. She reported that she told him to stop and said no, but he continued to rub her leg, unzipped his pants, exposed himself, masturbated while rubbing her leg, and ejaculated on her bed. She stated she did not scream because she feared he would harm her, and after he finished, she ran to the nurse’s station and informed staff of what had occurred. During interview, she was visibly shaken and crying, reported being afraid it would happen again, and said she cried every time she entered her room. A roommate reported observing the male resident enter the room, go to the abused resident’s side of the room, and ask for sexual favors, then hearing “wet noise” and sexual sounds before telling him to leave; she stated he asked for a minute, later adjusted his pants, and left. Nursing staff documented that the resident came to the nurse’s station and reported that a male resident had entered her room and behaved inappropriately. An LPN assessed her and found her crying and in emotional distress; the resident told the LPN that the male resident exposed himself, pleasured himself while rubbing her leg, and ejaculated on her sheets, which the LPN removed and bagged. Social services staff and another resident reported that, prior to this incident, the male resident had been sexually inappropriate with another resident and had repeatedly asked another female resident for sexual favors, including offering marijuana in exchange, leading social services to instruct nursing staff to monitor him more closely and keep him in his room at night. The psychiatrist stated he was not informed by the facility that the male resident was making inappropriate sexual advances toward other residents, despite his known sexual preoccupation and comments about women. The facility’s own criminal history analysis for the male resident identified him as a moderate risk requiring closer supervision and more frequent observation than routine, with regular monitoring for behavioral changes and periodic assessment of supervision sufficiency, yet he was able to access and remain in another resident’s room at night, resulting in the sexual abuse. The facility’s abuse policy defined sexual abuse as non-consensual sexual contact of any type with a resident, including forced observation of masturbation and coerced or extorted sexual activity, and stated that even if there is capacity to give consent, consent obtained through intimidation, coercion, or fear is considered sexual abuse. The policy also stated that sexual abuse includes non-consensual sexual relationships between residents or a consensual relationship involving a resident who lacks cognitive ability to consent. Social services staff stated that the facility uses BIMS scores to assess sexual appropriateness and that a sexual relationship is not consensual if residents’ BIMS scores are not on the same cognitive level, noting that the abused resident and the male resident were not on the same cognitive level. Despite the male resident’s documented sexually inappropriate behaviors, prior complaints from other residents, and a risk assessment recommending closer supervision, he was not effectively restricted from entering other residents’ rooms at night, and the psychiatrist was not made aware of his escalating sexual advances. These actions and inactions led to the incident in which the cognitively impaired resident experienced non-consensual sexual contact and exposure, constituting the cited abuse deficiency.
Removal Plan
- Resident R4 was discharged and is no longer a resident in the facility.
- Resident R1 was assessed for abuse risk identifying resident as high risk for abuse and an abuse care plan was initiated; R1 was reassessed for abuse risk and the care plan was reviewed.
- All current residents were reassessed for abuse risk using Screen for Abuse & Neglect UDA and each resident's abuse care plan was reviewed; Abuse UDA is completed on all new admissions within 72 hours of admission as well as quarterly, annually, and as needed by Social Services.
- A list was created of residents with a history of sexually inappropriate behaviors; the list is provided to the floors in a binder at the nursing station for identification/reference; the list will be updated as needed and reviewed at least weekly by Social Services; sources used include background check process, CHIRP, and Social Services assessment.
- Nursing staff including Social Services were in-serviced regarding the list of residents with sexually inappropriate behaviors to aid identification and ensure immediate reporting to the nurse supervisor and/or social service supervisor on call.
- Residents identified as exhibiting sexually inappropriate behaviors will be monitored every 2 hours by Nursing, Social Services and other designee with documentation on a monitoring tracker in the Residents Exhibiting Sexual Abuse Binder located at each nursing station.
- All newly hired nurses, CNAs, and Social Service workers will be in-serviced on the processes pertaining to the list of residents identified with sexually inappropriate behaviors prior to start date by the HR Director.
- All contracted workers will be in-serviced on abuse including reporting by the Administrator/designee.
- A protocol was created to provide various avenues to determine a resident's consent.
- All current residents were reassessed for cognitive ability to consent using the Brief Interview for Mental Status UDA by Social Services.
- An audit was completed to identify residents currently taking part in an intimate relationship; residents were identified and assessed by Social Services as able to consent based on BIMS score; their intimate relationship care plans were reviewed and updated.
- Residents identified as consenting to intimate relationships will be monitored weekly by Social Services to ensure continued consent; the list will be updated weekly and as necessary.
- Facility employees were in-serviced on the abuse policy with emphasis on sexual abuse.
- An additional all-in-house in-service was conducted on the abuse policy with emphasis on identifying and reporting inappropriate sexual behaviors.
- A QA audit tool was developed to monitor residents identified with sexually inappropriate behaviors to ensure identification and reporting is done immediately; to be completed 3 times per week for 12 weeks by Social Services/designee.
- A QA audit tool was developed to monitor residents identified as consenting to intimate relationships to ensure they continue to consent and are care planned; to be completed 3 times per week for 12 weeks by Social Services/designee.
- Results and trends from the QA audits will be discussed by the Assistant Administrator in the monthly QAPI meeting until resolution.
- The Medical Director was made aware of the abatement plan and agreed.
Elopement of High-Risk Resident Due to Inadequate Supervision and Nonfunctioning Exit Alarm
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure a safe environment and adequate supervision for a resident with a known history of elopement and severe cognitive impairment. The resident, who lived on a locked second-floor unit requiring a card key for elevator use, had previously eloped in September 2025 and was care planned and assessed as high risk for elopement, with dementia, impaired thought processes, poor short- and long-term memory, and severe cognitive impairment. The resident’s physician stated the resident was confused and required supervision when leaving the facility, and a psychiatrist note documented a history of auditory hallucinations. On the day of the incident, the resident was last seen at 11:30 AM. At 11:50 AM, a CNA went to the resident’s room to bring him to lunch and could not locate him. Nursing staff initiated a search of the facility, including outside areas, but were unable to find the resident. During this search, an RN checked the basement exit door and found that it did not alarm when opened. Multiple staff members, including the RN, CNA, and receptionist at the main desk facing the elevator and main exit, reported that they did not hear any door alarms around the time the resident went missing, and the receptionist did not see the resident exit via the elevator or main entrance. External reports and interviews confirmed that the resident had left the facility unsupervised. A sheriff’s report documented that the resident was reported missing and was later located offsite, and an employee at a nearby oil change shop reported that a confused man matching the resident’s description arrived there, was not appropriately dressed for the cold weather, and then wandered off, prompting a 911 call. Law enforcement later found the resident at a scrap metal recycling center approximately 1.6 miles from the facility, and a police officer stated the resident would have had to cross three busy, heavily traveled roads to reach that location. Hospital records showed the resident was evaluated in the emergency room for cold exposure. Subsequent testing of the basement exit door by maintenance confirmed that the door alarm did not activate when opened, and maintenance staff stated the alarm should have been activated and must have been turned off.
Removal Plan
- Revise and use the facility Elopement Risk Policy and Procedure to identify residents at risk for unsupervised exit; complete the Elopement Risk Assessment by Social Services upon admission, quarterly, and with change of condition.
- Complete R1 Social Service Unauthorized Departure/Elopement Risk Assessment and update R1 care plan.
- Have psychiatrist NP reassess R1 and increase olanzapine to twice daily.
- Move R1 to a room closer to the nursing station for closer monitoring.
- Place R1 on hourly safety checks.
- Review all residents at risk; revise the Elopement Book and update care plans by Social Services; monitor residents with elopement risk on an individualized basis based on risk assessment; provide continued staff training on elopement-risk residents; update the Elopement Risk Book with changes in residents’ appearance/condition and complete care plan changes at the time of book updates.
- Have 2nd-floor staff alternate desk coverage to monitor the elevator to prevent residents from entering; require staff to complete a sign-in/sign-out sheet to ensure 24/7 coverage indefinitely.
- Assign the floor nurse to check emergency exit doors for proper function by opening the door to confirm alarm sounds and resetting with key twice per shift; if alarms do not sound, notify Maintenance immediately.
- Have Maintenance test all exit doors to the outside daily to ensure doors are armed and alarms sound when opened.
- Begin in-services on the updated Elopement Risk Policy/Procedures and Elopement Risk Book for all departments, including the elevator monitoring plan and exit door procedures; complete all in-servicing.
- Implement daily random audits of elevator sign-in logs, unit emergency exit door checks, and outside exit door checks by the DON or designee; inform the Medical Director and involve them in QA; review progress at QA meetings to ensure corrections are achieved and permanent.
Failure to Supervise Cognitively Impaired Residents With Known Sexual Behaviors
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to protect residents from sexual abuse when a male dementia resident engaged in sexual contact with a female dementia resident’s breast in the dining room. The incident occurred when the female resident, who had a documented history of socially inappropriate and sexually oriented behaviors, including objectifying males and making crude sexual remarks, was left unsupervised with the male resident in the dining room. Her behavior care plan, in place since 2015, specifically identified her lack of boundaries, sexually oriented comments, and gestures, and included an intervention that unsupervised visiting with male residents should be discouraged and prevented when possible. Despite this, staff allowed her to remain in the dining room with a male resident without continuous supervision before the meal was served. The male resident also had a behavior care plan for socially inappropriate behavior, including flirtatious behavior toward a peer, and had diagnoses of dementia, major depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder, with documented poor insight and judgment and significant cognitive deficits. Both residents had psychiatric evaluations indicating they were oriented only to person, with significant short- and long-term memory deficits and impaired attention and concentration. The psychiatric nurse practitioner and LCSW stated that neither resident had the decision-making capacity to consent to sexual activity or make informed decisions. The facility’s own Sexual Abuse Prevention and Management of Sexual Behaviors policies defined sexual abuse as non-consensual sexual contact and stated that consent cannot be given if a resident is cognitively impaired, and that the facility must intervene when one or both individuals lack the ability to provide informed consent. On the day of the incident, a dietary aide entered the dining room while setting up for lunch and observed the male resident sucking on the female resident’s breast after she had lifted her shirt. The aide reported that no other staff were present in the dining room at that time and that security footage showed the two residents making inappropriate contact whenever staff left the dining room and stopping when someone entered. A CNA confirmed that she had placed drinks and seen the two residents sitting together, then left the dining room before food arrived, leaving no staff present. Multiple staff interviews showed that staff were aware the female resident could be sexually inappropriate, made sexual comments, and asked other residents to perform sexual acts, but CNAs reported they were unaware of any special interventions beyond separating her when she made inappropriate comments, and that continuous monitoring of the dining room only occurred once meals were served. The abuse coordinator and regional nurse consultant later stated they believed sexual abuse was unsubstantiated because both residents appeared to enjoy the act, despite the facility’s policies and professional assessments that cognitively impaired residents could not provide informed consent.
Removal Plan
- R2 continues to reside in the facility with no further incidents and suffered no negatives effects.
- R2's physician and responsible party were notified; responsible party had no concerns.
- R2 was sent to the hospital; no new findings and no new orders were received.
- R2 was moved to the secured female unit.
- R3 continues to reside in the facility with no further incidents and suffered no negative effects.
- R3's physician and daughter were notified; daughter voiced no concerns.
- R3 was sent to the hospital; no new findings and no new orders were received.
- R3 was on a 1:1 with staff until R3 left for the hospital.
- R3 was moved to the secured male unit.
- Law Enforcement was notified and concluded investigation with no findings.
- Social Services completed assessments on behavior, potential abuse and trauma for R2 and R3.
- Care plans were reviewed and updated as indicated on potential for abuse, behavior and trauma.
- Assessments and care plans will be completed per assessment schedule and as needed.
- Social Services completed and reviewed assessments on residents identified with sexually inappropriate behaviors.
- Care plans were reviewed and updated as needed for residents identified with sexually inappropriate behaviors.
- DON/ADON and/or designee communicated plan of care to staff.
- A behavior monitoring binder was created and placed at the nurses' station showing residents with behaviors and their plan of care; binder will be reviewed and updated weekly and as needed by DON/ADON/Social Services and/or designee.
- For identified residents with sexually inappropriate behaviors, behavior monitoring started every 2 hours for 2 weeks and every shift thereafter while awake by nursing staff, documented on a behavior monitoring log.
- Findings from behavior monitoring will be escalated to the abuse officer and ADON for protocol implementation immediately.
Failure to Thoroughly Investigate and Protect Cognitively Impaired Resident From Repeated Sexual Abuse Allegations
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to conduct thorough investigations into multiple allegations of sexual abuse and to protect a cognitively impaired resident from potential further abuse during and after those investigations. The resident, admitted with diagnoses including hypertension with heart failure, dementia, narcolepsy, chronic respiratory failure, and osteoarthritis, was documented as severely cognitively impaired and unable to consent to sexual advances. Hospital records and family statements indicated the resident had always been mentally slow and did not like to be touched. Despite this vulnerability, the facility did not implement protective measures after repeated staff reports of concerning interactions between the resident and a family member. The first allegation occurred when a CNA reported feeling uncomfortable after entering the resident’s room and observing the family member quickly moving his hands away from the resident’s lap/stomach area on two occasions. The written investigation from the Administrator and Social Services Director concluded no abuse occurred, relying largely on the family member’s explanation that he was startled and holding a computer, and did not document any protective interventions or assessment of the resident’s vulnerability. Later interview with the CNA revealed additional details not included in the investigation, including that the resident’s shirt was lifted exposing her breast, that the resident would not have been able to expose herself, and that the family member intervened quickly when staff attempted to adjust the resident’s clothing. No additional staff statements or corroborating documentation were included in the investigation. A second documented allegation involved staff observations of the same family member positioned very close over the resident, with the resident’s wheelchair reclined and the family member reacting abruptly when staff entered, including jumping up and requesting privacy. A dietary aide’s written statement indicated she saw the family member’s hands under the resident’s blanket and that he jumped up quickly when she entered, causing a pillow to fall. In interviews, staff described not being able to see the family member’s hands, the resident appearing shocked and jumpy, and reports that the resident cried after the family member’s visits and seemed not to want to be touched. These details, including the aide’s observation of the arm under the blanket, were not reflected in the facility’s written investigation, which the Administrator and Business Office Manager confirmed as complete. Additional allegations arose in December when a CNA reported entering the room and seeing the family member with one leg on a chair and the resident’s shirt pushed up below her breasts, with the family member stating they were playing cards and telling the CNA to leave. The CNA stated he wrote a report and left it at the nurse’s desk, and another CNA confirmed being told of this incident but did not report it herself. The Administrator and Business Office Manager acknowledged being told about the leg-on-chair incident and viewing video footage from the family’s personal camera on the family member’s cell phone, but they did not initiate a formal investigation, did not verify the date or time of the footage, and relied on the video and the family member’s denial to decide not to investigate further. Another CNA later reported seeing the family member with his leg up on the resident’s wheelchair, wearing nylon shorts, jumping back and pulling his pant leg down when she entered, and appearing very anxious; she reported this to the Business Office Manager. Throughout these events, the facility did not initiate thorough investigations, did not consistently collect and reconcile staff statements, did not verify or preserve objective evidence, and did not implement care plan interventions or protective measures to keep the resident safe from further potential abuse. The facility’s abuse policy required immediate reporting of suspected abuse to the Administrator and mandated that the Administrator or designee report abuse to the state agency per state and federal requirements, and that employees report reasonable suspicion of a crime against a resident to law enforcement. Despite this, the Administrator stated she did not begin a sexual abuse investigation when informed by the surveyor because she did not know who it involved, and acknowledged that the investigations from the earlier dates were the complete investigations. The resident’s care plan, updated shortly before the survey, addressed self-care deficits but did not include any potential for abuse or interventions to keep the resident safe. Law enforcement later indicated that a staff member reported seeing the family member drop his pants and have his penis in the resident’s face and stated that the facility needed to take action and remove the family member and find a new POA. The surveyors determined that Immediate Jeopardy began with the first allegation and that the facility failed to protect the resident from further allegations of abuse and failed to conduct thorough investigations into four separate sexual abuse allegations involving the same family member.
Removal Plan
- Issued a visitor restriction notice to V17 by the Social Services Director to ensure R42’s safety.
- Abuse Coordinating Team called V39 to inform her the visitor restriction was moved to indefinite and explained the reasons.
- Mailed the visitor restriction letter and emailed it to V17 and V39.
- Obtained email acknowledgement of receipt of the restriction.
- Informed V17 the restriction is indefinite and related to safety concerns regarding incidents.
- Administrator ordered a camera system for public areas (hallways) to aid staff/resident safety and monitor visitors.
- Implemented nursing rounds at the end of every shift to verify the resident has remained free of abuse.
- Social Services Director initiated visits with the resident twice weekly to monitor for psychosocial changes.
- Interviewed all residents and documented they reported feeling safe and free of abuse/neglect.
- Administration to round on every shift to monitor activities.
- Initiated a sexual abuse care plan for R42.
- Updated the physician (Dr. [NAME]).
- Initiated an Abuse Checklist to ensure compliance and document all required steps with abuse reporting.
- Completed all-staff in-services on the Abuse Checklist.
- Implemented a team-based approach for all investigations to ensure accuracy and completeness for each allegation received.
- Implemented the Abuse Checklist for Abuse Coordinators to use with all received documentation (including statements) to conduct thorough investigations including resident assessments and interviews.
- Re-inserviced all staff on the facility Abuse and Neglect Policy.
- Abuse Coordinators conducted random competency checks.
- Added the new Abuse Checklist to new staff onboarding.
- QAPI members to hold a monthly QAPI meeting to discuss abuse investigations, staff compliance, and staff understanding of facility policy.
Failure to Protect Resident From Sexual Abuse and Inadequate Abuse Investigation
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to protect a resident from sexual abuse by a CNA. The cognitively intact resident, who required staff assistance for most ADLs and used a wheelchair, reported that on a night shift the CNA who routinely put her to bed and provided incontinence care climbed into her bed around 9–10 PM, lay sideways on top of the comforter, rubbed the side of her breast through the blanket, and made sexually inappropriate comments including that she could be his girlfriend, “you know you want it,” and “come on honey.” The resident stated she repeatedly told him to stop, to get out, and to leave her room. She reported that the night before this incident the CNA had been “way too friendly,” which led her to anticipate further inappropriate behavior. The resident reported the incident to the Social Services Director at the end of February, telling him what had happened. The Social Services Director acknowledged that when the resident began to describe an issue involving her chest, he stopped her, focused only on the fact that it involved her breasts, and immediately contacted the Administrator, without listening to or retaining the full details of her report. The Administrator then spoke with the resident by phone; the Administrator’s documentation and interview reflect that the allegation was characterized as the CNA touching the resident’s breast during routine ADL/peri care while she was on the edge of the bed, and the facility’s written incident report framed the allegation as occurring during routine care and described the resident’s interview as “inconsistent.” The facility’s investigation concluded the allegation was unsubstantiated, and the CNA denied any inappropriate touching, stating he only repositioned the resident during care and asserting that she sometimes said things that were not true. Another cognitively intact resident reported that she was on the phone with the abused resident during the incident and heard the male CNA making sexual remarks such as “come on honey” while the resident repeatedly told him to quit, go away, and get out of her room; she stated no one from the facility had interviewed her about what she heard. The abused resident’s sister reported that the resident, whom she described as of sound mind and normally very talkative, became unusually quiet and withdrawn, and later disclosed that the CNA had “jumped into bed” with her and rubbed her breast, and that another person told her “don’t start anything, we will take care of it.” The sister stated the resident was embarrassed and fearful at night and that she had been told the CNA was moved to a memory floor. The resident’s husband confirmed that his wife told him a CNA had gotten into bed with her. Facility records showed that prior to the surveyor’s investigation, the resident’s care plan had been revised to describe her as having “socially inappropriate behavior” and a history of telling different stories to different staff, despite no documented history of false abuse allegations, and the facility’s abuse policy required immediate protection of residents and prompt, aggressive investigation of all abuse reports, including sexual abuse such as sexual harassment, coercion, or assault. Law enforcement later interviewed the resident and the phone witness; the deputy summarized that the resident reported the CNA jumped into bed with her, said she could be his girlfriend, and touched the sides of her breasts, while the other resident reported hearing the CNA fall into the bed, attempt to kiss the resident, and persist in making sexual remarks and pushing for relations while the resident said no. Staff familiar with the resident, including an RN and the Social Services Director, described her as alert, oriented, and without behaviors, and similarly described the phone witness as alert, oriented, and a reliable historian. Despite these consistent accounts and corroborating witness information, the facility’s internal documentation continued to characterize the allegation as unsubstantiated and did not reflect that the phone witness had been interviewed as part of the initial investigation. These actions and omissions resulted in the facility’s failure to protect the resident from sexual abuse by a staff member and to fully and accurately investigate and respond to the allegation in accordance with its abuse policy.
Removal Plan
- Perform full body check on resident; document findings.
- Perform full body checks on residents in the facility who are not interviewable; document findings.
- Notify family and physician.
- Update resident care plan pertaining to the alleged abuse.
- Immediately suspend the CNA pending an investigation.
- Review facility resources for stress management and the abuse policy related to the occurrence; revise as indicated.
- Educate staff on how to take an initial report of abuse and what should be included in the report.
- Educate the Social Service Director on how to take an initial report of abuse and what should be included in the report.
- Educate the Administrator on how to conduct a thorough investigation and how to determine if abuse occurred.
- Assess residents for any markings that could be related to physical contact and interview residents who are able to be interviewed; document findings.
- Conduct interviews with residents and document concerns.
- Re-educate all staff and managers on the facility abuse policy, abuse prevention, and stress management.
- Provide pop quizzes to staff about abuse.
- Review compliance using a Quality Assurance audit tool for abuse.
- Review results of abuse audits with the interdisciplinary team.
- Discuss the abuse policy and prevention with all new hires at new hire orientation.
- Audit all residents' abuse assessments and abuse care plans for accuracy; review audits by the QA committee, evaluate trends/patterns, and implement corrective actions as indicated.
- Hold an emergency QA meeting with the interdisciplinary care team and Medical Director to discuss the abuse allegation and plans of correction and obtain approval of the plan of correction.
Failure to Secure Nonfunctioning Exit Door Alarm Resulting in Resident Elopement
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to prevent a cognitively impaired resident from eloping through an exit door whose audible alarm was known by staff to be nonfunctioning, and the failure to secure that door in accordance with facility policy. The resident was an older adult with unspecified dementia, severe cognitive impairment per the MDS, and multiple significant medical diagnoses including a history of fractures, COPD, and chronic diastolic and systolic CHF. The MDS showed the resident required assistance with multiple ADLs, including supervision for ambulation with a walker up to 50 feet, and walking greater than 150 feet was not attempted due to medical or safety concerns. Despite this, the resident was able to leave the building undetected through the unalarmed Unit B exit door and was later found outside by staff. On the day of the incident, staff on Unit B, including the assigned CNA and the RN, were aware from shift report that the Unit B exterior door alarm was not working, and they had also been informed earlier in the week that the same door alarm was not functioning. The RN on Unit B spoke with the resident at the nurses’ station as the resident was leaving the dining room with a walker and observed the resident continue walking down the hall toward the B wing exit door near a specified room, even though the resident’s own room was located on a different hallway. The resident was not redirected away from the unalarmed exit door. The RN reported that the door alarm panel at the nurses’ station only displayed a red flashing light when an exit door was opened, that the panel was behind her, and that she did not hear any audible alarm when the resident exited, so she did not look at the panel. A CNA working on Unit A later observed the resident standing alone outside the Unit A exit door and notified staff on Unit B. Two CNAs from Unit B and the CNA from Unit A went outside through the Unit B exit door, which opened without sounding an alarm, and found the resident outside by the Unit A exit door. The CNAs described the resident as weak, repeatedly stating “I’m cold,” with skin cold to the touch, and too weak to continue walking, requiring use of a wheelchair to return inside. The resident later recalled going out a door into the cold, not knowing how to get back in, walking until finding a door with a window, and knocking until someone came, stating that it felt like a long time and that the resident began saying prayers hoping someone would come. The physician was not notified of the elopement, and there was no incident report, investigation, or progress note documented in the medical record at the time of the occurrence, despite facility policy requiring notification of the attending physician/NP, full body assessment with vitals, and documentation in the medical record following an elopement. The facility’s written policy on Door Alarm Function Test states that when alarms are nonfunctioning, the door must be made secure by placement of an additional temporary alarm or added supervision until repair is made. Staff interviews confirmed that the Unit B exit door alarm was known to be nonfunctioning on the day of the incident and earlier in the week, yet no staff member was assigned specifically to monitor the exit door, and there were only three staff on the 2 PM–10 PM shift on that unit. The resident walked approximately 195 feet from the Unit B nurses’ station, where last observed by the RN, to the location outside where the resident was found, without being observed or redirected by staff. The attending physician later stated that the physician had not been informed that the resident had exited the facility unnoticed and acknowledged that the resident leaving unsupervised had potential for harm due to risk of injury related to falls or becoming disoriented and lost.
Removal Plan
- Complete a head count on all units to ensure no other residents were affected and every resident is accounted for.
- Check all facility door alarms for proper functionality and good working order; complete and document door alarm verification checks once per day by the Maintenance Director/Building Manager or manager on duty.
- Install a temporary exit audible door alarm on the Unit B exit door.
- Complete R1's elopement assessment and update the care plan.
- Assess all residents for exit-seeking behaviors.
- Update care plans for residents identified at risk for elopement.
- Review facility policies related to door alarms, routine resident checks, and elopement.
- Review and update all residents' safety care plans as needed.
- Review and update the elopement binder with current identification picture, face sheet, and elopement care plan; ensure binders are available at each nurses station.
- In-service all staff on redirecting wandering residents away from exits, promoting safer outcomes through supervision, answering door alarms promptly, reporting changes in cognition or exit-seeking behaviors to the nurse, routine resident check policy, and where to locate at-risk-of-elopement binders; continue until all employees have been educated, educate anyone not yet educated prior to returning to work, and educate new staff upon hire at general orientation.
- Develop an audit tool to review compliance and update the QA Door Alarm Check Verification form; complete audits twice a week for 1 month or until compliance is maintained.
- Hold an emergency QA meeting regarding the incident to discuss and approve the plan.
Elopement Through Window Due to Inadequate Supervision and Nonfunctional Window Alarm
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to adequately supervise a cognitively impaired resident and to ensure the environment was free from accident hazards, resulting in an elopement through a bedroom window. The resident was an 83-year-old female with advanced dementia and a care plan identifying her as at risk for elopement and unable to make decisions regarding her safety. Her care plan included approaches such as knowing her whereabouts at all times and offering one-on-one activities when she appeared restless. Staff interviews consistently described her as frequently exit seeking, having numerous behaviors, and questioning instructions, but with no prior history of attempting to leave through a window. On the day of the incident, the resident was on COVID isolation in the memory care unit. A registered nurse reported having just returned the resident to her room, leaving the door open because the resident was a fall risk. Shortly thereafter, the Memory Care Director reopened the resident’s door after the resident had closed it, observing the resident seated in a chair with her lunch tray in front of her. Staff then proceeded to assist with passing lunch trays to other residents. Within approximately 10–15 minutes from the time the nurse placed the resident in her room, a resident assistant leaving the facility noticed that the screen was off one of the memory care windows and notified the receptionist and the Memory Care Director. When the Memory Care Director went to the resident’s room, she found the door closed, the window open, and the resident gone. Staff initiated a search inside and outside the building. The Memory Care Director reported seeing the resident’s bright pink sweater across a field near a roadway, along with a pickup truck and a police squad car. A receptionist stated that police called asking if the facility was missing a resident after a woman had been found near an auto parts store. The police report documented that a bystander had the resident in a pickup truck, that officers contacted the facility and confirmed the resident lived there, and that staff reported they had been searching for approximately 10 minutes. EMS documentation indicated the resident was found wandering near the roadway in a confused state, with advanced dementia, and had been moving on foot for an unknown period of time after eloping through a window. The Maintenance Director later stated that the window alarms on the unit were old, that the alarm on the window used by the resident had been knocked off, and that there had been no system in place to check the old alarms. The Director of Nursing confirmed there was no policy or plan regarding window alarms and no system for checking them, despite alarms being present to alert staff when windows were opened.
Removal Plan
- Maintenance was called to change the window locks to a lower position to prevent the resident from opening the window more than halfway.
- Administrator ordered new window alarms.
- Memory Care Director/Designee initiated an all-staff in-service on missing resident policy and protocol and alternative call light/call system, including frequent monitoring of residents, including cognitively impaired residents.
- New window alarms were installed on the resident's window and all other resident windows in the Memory Care Unit.
- Maintenance to include checking window alarms during door alarm checks.
- Facility Department Heads conducted a unit wide walk through of the Memory Care Unit to assure all window alarms are in place and functional.
- An audit tool was developed for maintenance to check that window alarms are in place and functional; information will be reported by the Maintenance Director to the QA Committee.
- Facility Department Heads verified resident room doors are open and residents are visible.
- In-services scheduled for all staff to include missing resident policy and protocol; alternate call system; frequent monitoring of residents and verifying doors are open, including cognitively impaired residents; ensuring window alarms are in place and in the alarm position when checking residents; maintenance in-serviced on the use of the audit tool to check that window alarms are in place and functional; staff not present will be in-serviced prior to their next scheduled shift.
- All new hires during orientation will be in-serviced on missing resident policy and protocol, alternate call system, and checking window alarms when entering resident rooms in the Memory Care Unit.
- Resident belongings were moved to a room in the memory care unit within an external gated area.
- Audits were developed on missing resident, alternative call and window alarm monitoring; Administrator, Director of Nursing, or designee will complete ongoing audits on alternating shifts; information will be reported by the Administrator to the QA committee.
- Maintenance Director contacted the facility's electronic monitoring company to obtain information to install hard wired alarms to windows and the external gate in the Memory Care Unit.
Repeated Elopements Due to Failed Elopement Risk Management and Wander Guard Oversight
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to provide adequate supervision and elopement prevention for a cognitively intact resident with schizophrenia, depression, anxiety, gait abnormalities, obesity, and hypertension, who had a documented history of exit-seeking and elopement risk. As early as 4/23/25, nursing notes documented that the resident attempted to leave the building and had to be redirected. On 6/21/25, the resident left through the front lobby door and was redirected back, prompting an elopement risk assessment that identified the resident as at risk and led to an elopement care plan and an order for an electronic monitoring device (wander guard) on 6/25/25. Despite this, subsequent elopement risk assessments dated 6/23/25 and 9/25/25, completed by a social worker, incorrectly documented that the resident was not at risk for elopement, which the social worker later acknowledged as clinical errors. Exit-seeking behavior on 9/28/25 was documented, but no new elopement assessment or care plan update was completed, and the resident remained on an unsecured floor where residents could freely access the elevator without a code. On 10/12/25, the resident eloped again. Earlier that day, the resident attempted to leave through the front door but was stopped and given Haldol 5 mg by the LPN, who did not report the exit-seeking behavior because the resident had not yet left the facility. Later, the resident could not be located, and a code pink was called; the resident ultimately presented to a hospital stating he had left the nursing facility because he was hearing voices. Hospital documentation indicated the facility nurse reported that the resident had tried to elope earlier and had been medicated. When the resident returned to the facility that evening, open areas were noted on the soles of both feet. Although there was a physician order from 6/25/25 through 10/31/25 to check the electronic monitoring device placement and functionality every shift, the LPN documented "N" (no device in place) for multiple days in October and admitted that the device was not on the resident, that this was not reported to administration or a supervisor, and that the absence of the device was not corrected even after the 10/12/25 elopement. On 2/6/26, the resident eloped a third time, this time from a different unit. The resident had previously been on a secure locked unit (3 North) from 10/15/25 to 1/8/26 without elopements, but after a hospital stay was readmitted on 1/16/26 to an unsecured unit (3 South) where residents knew the elevator code. On the morning of 2/6/26, the LPN on 3 South saw the resident at the elevator stating he was going to the first-floor vending machine, and allowed him to leave the floor unsupervised, not knowing he was an elopement risk and unaware of any wander guard order or device. The resident, who knew the elevator code, reached the first floor, where the receptionist—who did not know the resident was an elopement risk and did not recognize him as a resident—buzzed him out the front door, believing he was staff. The receptionist later stated that the front door wander guard alarm did not sound and that the resident did not have an electronic monitoring device in place. The resident was later found at the hospital after having run, tripped, and fallen, sustaining a closed head injury, chipped and missing teeth, and a lower lip laceration requiring sutures. Throughout these events, staff on multiple units and at the front desk did not consistently know which residents were elopement risks, elopement assessments were inaccurately completed, the care plan was not consistently updated after exit-seeking or elopement events, and the physician order for the electronic monitoring device was discontinued without documented rationale, contributing to the resident’s repeated elopements and injuries. The Immediate Jeopardy was determined to have begun on 10/12/25, when the resident eloped and returned with bilateral foot injuries, and continued through the subsequent elopement on 2/6/26, during which the resident sustained a head injury and oral trauma. The facility’s own interviews and records showed that staff failed to consistently implement and monitor the ordered electronic monitoring device, failed to reassess and accurately document elopement risk after each incident or exit-seeking behavior, and allowed the resident to access unsecured exits and elevator codes despite a known history of elopement. The administrator acknowledged that the resident’s first documented elopement on 6/21/25 was not reported to the state agency and that no incident report or police notification occurred because there was no injury. The DON later confirmed that if a wander guard order exists and the device is not in place, nursing staff are responsible for immediately obtaining and applying a device and notifying leadership, which did not occur in this case. These combined failures in assessment, care planning, communication, and monitoring led to repeated unsupervised departures of the resident from the facility and associated injuries.
Removal Plan
- Reassess all residents for elopement risk and monitor elopement risk assessments to ensure residents are reassessed when there is a change in status.
- Review all resident care plans and revise as needed; review care plans with each change to the elopement assessment.
- Review and update the elopement binder at the front desk and on the units to ensure all residents at risk for elopement with wander guard are listed, including new admissions and re-admissions; review and update the binder with changes in resident status to ensure accuracy.
- Retrain all staff on elopement procedures, including Code Pink procedure, signs of elopement, the elopement policy, and how to identify residents at risk for elopement; retrain staff returning from leave prior to returning to work.
- Conduct Code Pink drills on all shifts to monitor staff response and identify opportunities for additional training; continue Code Pink drills.
- Conduct an ad hoc QAPI meeting with the Medical Director to discuss elopement events and facility follow up.
- Review the elopement policy with the IDT team.
- Update the elevator key code and install a new keypad; instruct staff to know the elevator key code and not disclose it to residents; change the elevator code routinely and remind staff not to disclose the code to residents.
- Audit residents who utilize wander guard and ensure each has a corresponding order to check the device each shift on the MAR and a reminder in the EMR; implement a functionality log to monitor device function and monitor for compliance.
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